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APPENDIX 0
REPORT OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY 
OF WAR, ADMIRAL WILLIAM F. HALSEY, JR AND ADMIRAL 
THEODORE S. WILKINSON, FEBRUARY 20, 1945.
A little after 12 o'clock Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr. 
accompanied by Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson called on the 
Secretary of War. Mr. McCloy was present.
The Admiral stated that Secretary Forrestal had asked 
that on his visit to Washington he communiate with the Secretary 
of War and give that Department the benefit of his thoughts on 
the matter of our security in the Pacific. At the outset 
Admiral Halsey said he felt from what he had seen of the Japanese 
too many of them were unregenerate and there was no hope of 
educating them to a decent life; that their religion and tradi­
tions were such that it was hopeless to suppose they would 
willingly conform to peaceful conditions in the Pacific, at 
least not within the next two or three generations. They would 
live under an abiding hatred for this country, which to their 
mind had merely interfered in the accomplishment of their just 
destiny. He said he thought it was necessary to establish our- 
selves in such a way as to compel the Japanese to conform in the 
hope that new generations would depart from the old ideas and 
carry on as desirable members of the community. He believed that
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we ought to think about the wisdom of applying a sort of extended 
armistice to them; that there should be no immediate peace - they 
should be compelled to live on probation until they satisfied 
everyone that they were prepared to operate on a decent basis.
This would require. he said, the establishment of ourselves 
firmly on the islands of the Pacific close to Japan and elsewhere 
so that we could rapidly move in to deal with them whenever they 
acted up, without fear of being cut off.
dt thie point the ddaliei brought up the fueetiea ef what 
our future policy ia China wae te he. He spoke of the dehate 
aaeag the strategists on whether to go directly into Japan er 
lead en the China coast. Be expressed the view that it wae 
perfectly feasible with our existing strength to land anywhere 
ca the China coast that we eav fit. The Secretary of War referred 
to the paper he had received from the State Bepartmeat ea thie 
subject (Appendix >)•
The discussion then turned te the Japanese maintaining 
themselves en the continent after being cut off from the hoaeland. 
Admiral Halsey and Admiral Wilkinson expressed the view that it 
would he very difficult for them to maintain themselves on the 
continent. They <uestioned whether M&nefaxikuo was sufficiently 
developed to export armies in the modern sense, once those armies
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were completely cut off from the islands.
Admiral Halsey said we should build up the Philippines
till they become a sort of Great Britain of the Pacific, so far
as we were concerned, aad that strong naval and military bases 
should be established and maintained there. In this connection, 
Admiral Wilkinson said that the Navy were about ready to report 
what they wished in the Philippines in the way of bases. The 
importance of coming to a conclusion on this was pointed out by 
the Secretary of War as one could not tell how rapidly the
 independence of the Philippines would be established. The question 
was raised as to how far along the Army was in their determination 
of what they might need in the Philippines and it was determined 
that this matter should be followed up at once. This led to a 
discussion of the mandated islands and other areas in the Pacific 
which might be of importance to us. Halsey expressed it as his 
view that certainly all the Japanese islands above the Equator 
should be ours and he did not like the idea of trusteeships. Not 
only these islands but the Volcano, Bonin and other islands to 
the south of Japan should be occupied and the appropriate ones 
fortified. He said, however, these would not be sufficient for 
a well rounded security. There were islands south of the Equator 
of greater importance to us. Manus Island, on which we had spent
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millions of dollars, was now a well running base and a strong 
effort should be made to maintain this base. It was developed 
at great expense and it protected our lower flank against any
operations that we might conduct against Japan in the future, 
and for every point of view it was a highly desirable strategic
point for us to maintain. He said we ought to be able to operate 
from our bases irrespective of the neutrality of the owner or former 
owner. He also spoke of the value of New Caledonia. He said the 
climate and harbors and the size of the islands made it ideal as 
a base, although its security value was not as immediately apparent 
as some of the islands to the north. The Admiral came back to 
the importance of Manns on several occasions. particularly as a 
protection to our flank in any future operations against Japan.
The need for a prompt and definite statement of our interests 
in the Pacific was emphasized both by Admiral Wilkinson and
Admiral Halsey and concurred in by the Secretary of War. The 
fact that the San Francisco Conference was coming on, which was 
to be preceded by a conference amongst the larger powers, at both 
of which meetings a discussion of * trusteeships “ would take place, 
emphasised this need. It was determined that steps should be 
taken to stimulate the studies which General XXbick and Admiral 
Wilson and others were making so that the Services could come
 '
forward promptly with a statement of their position.
Admiral Halsey expressed the view that the Japanese fleet
was pretty welll done in; that  landings could be effected in
almost any  area w chose and that in his judgment the Japanese 
would probably "break". He felt that as the military and naval 
figures become discredited. the industrialists might very well 
come forward with attractive peace terms. He strongly recommended 
that we should hold to an unconditional surrender position.
Both Admiral Halsey and Admiral Wilkinson emphasized that 
they were not speaking for the Navy in any sense but were simply 
coming in at the suggestion of the Secretary of the Navy to 
exchange ideas as individuals with the Secretary of War on our 
interests in the Pacificc. The Secretary of War stated his great 
appreciation of their calling upon him and told then he vas pre­
pared to do his utmost to support the vital needs of the Nvy as 
well as the Army in any opportunity which was afforded him in the 
determination of our policy.
